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Abstract 
The debt equity bias refers to the discrimination between debt and equity finance. This 
discrimination is problematic since it distorts companies’ decisions and increases systemic 
risk. The European Commission has recommended Sweden to eliminate or reduce the bias 
and the Swedish Ministry of Finance has gathered a committee to investigate possible 
solutions. Sørensen (2010) suggested that Sweden would benefit from implementing a reform 
called Allowance for Corporate Equity.  An Allowance for Corporate Equity, often referred to 
as ACE, would introduce a deduction for equity similar to the existing deduction for interest 
payments, eliminating the debt equity bias. It also offers other attractive features such as 
leaving marginal investment unaffected by taxation. Belgium, Croatia, Italy and Brazil are 
countries that have implemented ACE like reforms. These reforms are discussed and used to 
draw conclusions regarding the design of a Swedish ACE.  
The biggest problem of an implementation of the Allowance for Corporate Equity is that it 
narrows the tax base and consequently requires funding. It is often suggested that the statutory 
corporate tax rate needs to be increased to fund the reform but other alternatives that are less 
distortive are also discussed in this paper. Considering the current tax competition in Europe, 
the positive aspects of an ACE would struggle to outweigh the negative effects from an 
increased corporate tax rate. Sweden is unlikely to implement an ACE since it is supposed to 
be financed within the area of corporate taxation. If other sources of funding were allowed, an 
ACE would have been a more plausible option. A source of funding that seemed particularly 
interesting was the reintroduction of the recurrent property tax that was replaced by a low fee 
in 2008. The low fee together with the deductibility of interest payments and low amortization 
requirements channel too much investment into the housing market and implies a distortion of 
investment. A reintroduction of the recurrent property tax would generate revenue and 
eliminate the distortion. 
 
Key words: ACE, Allowance for Corporate Equity, Debt Equity Bias, Capital structure, 
Notional interest rate 
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1. Introduction 
Companies make the choice to finance their business either by borrowing money or by using 
equity, issuing securities for example. In most economies the cost of debt (interest payments) 
is deductible, while the cost of equity (dividends) is not. This discrimination between debt and 
equity is often called the debt equity bias or the debt bias and causes distortions in companies’ 
financial structure. The bias encourages companies to take on more leverage than what would 
be the optimal level without taxation. Excessive leverage makes companies more vulnerable 
when a crisis hits, which has a negative impact on systemic risk. This is even more evident 
after the financial crises of 2007/2008. 
 
The deductibility of interest payments creates incentives for debt shifting for multinationals. 
Multinationals shift debt within the group, deducting interest payments in a high-tax 
jurisdiction while paying taxes on the interest received in a low-tax jurisdiction. The 
possibility to shift debt for tax reasons implies an advantage for multinationals relative to 
domestic companies that are unable to do so. The European Commission has given 
recommendations to reduce the existing debt bias in Sweden as it is seen as problematic for 
both households and the corporate sector. 
 
A problem that is becoming increasingly relevant is the difficulty to distinguish between debt 
and equity. Hybrid instruments and financial derivatives can be used to create an instrument 
with equity-like characteristics that qualifies as debt.  This might seem like a solution to the 
problem since the instruments narrow the gap between debt and equity but the existence of 
these instruments is inefficient in itself. Designing the capital structure of the firm to avoid 
taxation is also an inefficient use of a company’s time. These instruments also reduce both 
transparency and accountability of firms’ corporate financing policies. Differences at country 
level exist as well; there is no coordinated view of what qualifies as debt and what qualifies as 
equity. Arbitrage possibilities are created when countries use different definitions. 
 
Allowance for Corporate Equity, often referred to as ACE, introduces deduction for equity in 
addition to the existing deductibility of interest payments. By allowing deductions to be made 
for dividend payments and private equity, the tax bias for debt and the subsequent distortion 
of financial structure is eliminated. Not only does the ACE eliminate incentives for debt 
shifting, it also shifts taxation from normal profits to pure profits, which means that taxation 
does not affect marginal investment. A tax that does not impact investment decisions of 
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companies is efficient; this is true when the effective marginal tax rate of new investment is 
zero. Sørensen (2010) wrote a report for the Swedish government, in which he proposes that 
Sweden would benefit from implementing an ACE. I have chosen to analyse the ACE because 
of its attractive neutrality features with respect to both scale of investment but also choice of 
financing. It is a relevant topic since Belgium and Italy have implemented ACE reforms in the 
last decade but also because of Sørensen’s (2010) recommendation. Finansdepartementet has 
gathered a committee to give suggestions regarding the debt equity bias, which makes it an 
even more relevant topic for Sweden at the moment. The paper will focus on analysing the 
implementation of an ACE, and only briefly describe other alternatives. I will use existing 
theory and other countries’ experiences and apply it to the situation in Sweden to analyse the 
effects of a Swedish ACE. 
 
After the introduction, a section explaining the debt equity bias and why it is problematic will 
follow. The properties of an ACE will be explained and other alternative reforms will briefly 
be covered. The next section of the paper will look at experiences from ACE reforms in 
practice. The reforms in Belgium, Brazil, Croatia and Italy will be discussed. After this I will 
describe the current situation in Sweden and why the debt bias and its elimination is a relevant 
topic. Sørensen’s (2010) recommendation regarding the ACE will also be explained in this 
section. The paper will end with an analysis that discusses the different choices that are made 
when an ACE is implemented, for example the choice of notional interest rate and whether to 
apply the allowance to pre-existing equity or not. Different sources of funding are also 
discussed, looking at revenue aspects, neutrality features and viability.  
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2. Theory 
The theory section will explain the debt equity bias, why it is problematic and why it needs to 
be eliminated or reduced. The ACE reform and its properties will be explained. Alternative 
reforms will also be explained although not to the same extent. The aim is to give the reader 
an overview of the problem and possible solutions to the discrimination between sources of 
funding. 
2.1 The debt equity bias 
Companies finance their business by issuing shares (equity) or by borrowing money (debt). In 
Sweden, and in many other countries, the interest paid on debt is deductible while the 
dividends paid to shareholders are not. This phenomenon is often called the debt equity bias 
or the debt bias and it provides an incentive for companies to finance their investments with 
debt rather than equity. As a result, companies take on more debt than what would be the 
optimal level without its beneficial tax treatment. The higher the amount of debt is, the higher 
is the value of interest payments and the lower is the taxable profit (since interest payments 
are deducted from the taxable income).  
The Modigliani Miller theorem states that the choice of financing through debt or equity does 
not influence the value of the firm if some conditions are met (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
The value of a firm that uses debt (a leveraged firm) will be equal to the value that the same 
firm would have if it had used equity instead (an unleveraged firm).  Since one of the 
conditions of the theorem is the absence of taxation1, it is obvious that these conditions are not 
met in practice. Existing taxation practices imply that the value of a leveraged firm is equal to 
the value of an unleveraged firm plus the tax shield2 (Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème 
2012). If no other factors were important when deciding the capital structure of the firm, in 
theory firms could maximize their value by using only debt. In practice there are other 
significant aspects to consider.  
Why is the debt equity bias problematic? 
When different investments and different sources of finance are not treated the same, a 
welfare loss occurs. This welfare loss originates from a sub-optimal investment level, funds 
invested in assets that are not the most productive ones or costs from arranging financial 
decisions to pay less tax. These inefficiencies can in their turn cause more inefficiency; when 
                                                          
1 The other conditions are that there are no bankruptcy costs, perfect markets and no information asymmetry. 
2 A tax shield is something that reduced the company’s taxable profits, such as an ACE allowance, depreciation 
allowances or the deductibility of interest payments. 
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companies arrange their financial decisions and activities to avoid taxation, the government 
might have to introduce more taxes (that are perhaps even more distortionary) to raise the 
revenue needed. Also, companies that have not tried or managed to arrange their financial 
decisions and activities in a tax avoiding manner will be penalized by paying a higher tax 
burden than the ones that have. The deductibility of interest payments creates incentives for 
debt shifting for multinationals. Multinationals shift debt within the group, deducting interest 
payments in a high-tax jurisdiction while paying taxes on the interest received in a low-tax 
jurisdiction. Domestic firms are unable to do this so the possibility of debt shifting gives 
multinationals an advantage over domestic firms (Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème 2012).  
 
After the financial crises of 2007/2008 and 2011 it is evident that the equity in the corporate 
sector has to be strengthened.  Not only does it reduce the vulnerability in the event of a 
financial crisis, it is also important for the establishment of companies for which the loss in 
absence of sufficient equity is private. This is particularly the case for risky investments. 
Higher solvency for the companies is also positive for lenders and can reduce macroeconomic 
fluctuations (Finansdepartementet 2011). 
Should the debt equity bias be eliminated? 
One argument for the discrimination is that the personal income tax often discriminates in the 
opposite way (taxing interest received at a higher rate than capital gains and dividends) but in 
Sweden this argument is irrelevant since both interest received and capital gains are taxed at 
30 % (Skatteverket 2014). Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème (2012) discuss the 
psychological aspect; people tend to see equity dividends as pure reward of capital and 
interest payments as a necessary cost. 
 
There are positive aspects to the use of debt finance. For example it is a tool to deal with the 
information asymmetry between shareholders and managers. Debt usage restricts the cash 
flow in the company and keeps the manager from making the company grow beyond what is 
optimal. When debt is used to finance the company's activities, the manager must pay out 
cash flows to bondholders instead (who are in some cases the same as the shareholders). 
However, several research papers have shown that with the narrowing gap between debt and 
equity due to the development of sophisticated instruments, there is no longer any rationale 
behind the discrimination. 
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A problem that is becoming increasingly relevant is the difficulty to distinguish between debt 
and equity. Hybrid instruments and financial derivatives can be used to create an instrument 
with equity-like characteristics that qualifies as debt (Auerbach, Devereux and Simpson 
2007). This might seem like a solution to the problem since the instruments narrow the gap 
between debt and equity but the existence of these instruments is inefficient in itself. 
Designing the capital structure of the firm to avoid taxation is also an inefficient use of a 
company’s time. These instruments also reduce both transparency and accountability of firms’ 
corporate financing policies. Differences at country level exist as well; there is no coordinated 
view of what qualifies as debt and what qualifies as equity. Arbitrage possibilities are created 
when countries use different definitions (Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème 2012).   
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2.2 Allowance for Corporate Equity 
The Allowance for Corporate equity was first proposed by Devereux and Freeman (1991). 
Inspiration was found in Boadway and Bruce’s paper (1984) that presented a neutral and 
inflation proof profits tax called Allowance for Corporate Capital, which will be described in 
more detailed later. Devereux and Freeman (1991) wanted to create a system that was more 
compatible with established conventions and relatively easy to implement in practice, the 
result was the ACE. The ACE implies a tax relief based on the funds that shareholders have 
put into the company (new equity and retained earnings); I will refer to this as the equity base. 
The system would be implemented and function parallel with the system of interest 
deductions.  
 
Figure 1 
When a country implements an ACE it chooses a notional interest rate that should reflect 
companies’ cost of equity. The government decides whether the notional interest rate can be 
multiplied with companies’ total equity or only with post-reform equity. The equity base is 
multiplied by the notional interest rate to get the notional return. Figure 1 shows an example 
where the equity base is $ 1 000 000. It is multiplied with a notional interest rate of 5 % and 
the notional return is then $ 50 000. This means that the company can deduct $ 50 000 from 
its taxable income. 
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The main idea of the ACE is to divide profits into normal profits (the profit investors require 
in order for the investment to be worthwhile) and pure profits (any profit exceeding that 
level). The company is allowed to deduct the cost of equity finance (approximated through the 
notional return showed in figure 1). This deduction is similar to the deduction for interest 
payments (the cost of debt finance). All profits are taxed but the cost of finance can be 
deducted, the result of this is that only pure profits are taxed. By taxing only pure profits, the 
level of economic activity and investment plans are not distorted by taxation. When a 
company raises finance, this finance will receive a relief corresponding to the normal profit 
but any profit above this level generated by these new assets will be taxed. For this to hold it 
is important that the notional interest rate chosen corresponds to the rate at which companies 
discount future allowances. 
The calculation of the equity base: 
 
By including taxable profits in the base, accelerated depreciation reduces the ACE allowance. 
Lower taxable profits imply a lower ACE allowance; miscalculations of the profit one year 
will give a lower allowance the following year. The same is true when the full economic 
depreciation is not deducted, then the allowance will be larger next year. The ACE hence 
remedies investment distortions. The purchase of shares in other companies is subtracted to 
avoid double counting; they will be counted in the equity base of the issuing company. 
Dividends received are included in the base of the acquiring company. When holding 
companies finance investments in subsidiaries using debt or a combination of debt and equity, 
the equity base is reduced. The negative effect on the notional return will be equal to the 
deduction for the interest payment made if the notional interest rate equals the interest rate on 
debt (Sørensen 2010). 
 
B1 = B0 + π + ACE + R + N – T – D - A 
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If the ACE is outlined in nominal terms, indexation is unnecessary. An overpayment of relief 
will be followed by an overpayment of tax. There might be a mismatch in the timing of 
payments but this will be offset in present value terms. Under inflationary conditions an asset 
is taxed at the nominal rise in its value but at the same time income will be overestimated and 
the two overestimations will cancel each other out. 
 
Choosing the right notional interest rate: 
When the notional interest rate is equal to the rate at which investors discount the future ACE 
allowances of the company, the ACE system eliminates the distortion of investment at the 
intensive margin (the choice of how much to invest). A company’s discount rate is often 
approximated using the risk-free market interest rate. The notional interest rate ensures that 
cash return to shareholders is taxed and equity that shareholders put into the company is 
deductible. The shareholder will try to maximize this net flow and when only the net flow is 
taxed, it does not affect decision-making. For this to hold, the ACE allowance must be certain 
so that the shareholder values it at the risk-free rate. When the notion of risk is accounted for, 
the authors still see strong benefits of using that formula. 
Quick review of present discounted value calculations 
When a company discounts future cash flows, it uses a discount rate that is equal to the risk-
free rate plus a compensation for risk, the discount rate will be denoted by d. In equation 1, it 
is shown how the present discounted value of future allowances is calculated. 
 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1
(1 + 𝑑)1
+ 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒2
(1 + 𝑑)2
+ 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒3
(1 + 𝑑)3
𝑒𝑡𝑐. 
Equation 1 
If the allowance and the discount rate are constant, the present discounted value of all future 
ACE allowances can be calculated as shown in equation 2. 
𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑑
 
       Equation 2 
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When new equity is put into the company it will generate an allowance equal to the new 
equity multiplied by the notional interest rate. In equation 3, equity invested is denoted by E 
and the notional interest rate is denoted by r. 
(𝐸 ×  𝑟)
𝑑
 
    Equation 3 
As can be seen in equation 3, the present discounted value of all future ACE allowance 
generated from the new equity invested will be equal to the amount of equity invested, but 
only if the notional interest rate is equal to the rate at which shareholders discount future 
allowances. For the notional interest rate to equal the risk-free rate, the ACE allowance must 
be discounted at the risk-free rate, which means that it has to be certain. Often, the allowance 
is not a hundred per cent certain due to asymmetric treatment of losses and gains or due to the 
risk of bankruptcy.  
In order for a system to be symmetric, governments would have to treat losses and gains in 
the same way, giving an immediate rebate on taxable losses. Governments are usually not to 
keen on this since it implies giving large sums of money to loss-making companies. For 
neutrality to hold the company must be certain of getting the tax credit of the unrelieved loss 
at some time in the future or claim immediate credit against tax paid. Allowing losses to be 
carried forward with an interest mark-up or treating an unrelieved loss as an undeclared profit 
reduces the problem.3 If the tax system is not symmetric, risky projects with possible negative 
outcomes will have a lower expected post-tax return and companies will be biased against 
investments that include the possibility of a loss even when we assume risk neutral investors4. 
If investors are risk averse they will require a risk premium to compensate for the uncertainty 
of outcome; they will require a higher expected return. A relief at the risk-free rate reduces 
both expected return and the uncertainty of outcomes, reducing the risk and hence reducing 
the risk premium that investors require. The government thus pays part of the losses of a loss-
making project and shares some of the revenue of profit-making investments. The effect on 
investors’ attitude towards risky projects will depend on how well the reduced risk 
                                                          
3 Losses typically reduce the equity base and hence future allowances, not declaring and including a loss in the 
equity base has the same effect as including it but carrying it forward with an interest mark-up. The loss does 
not reduce the equity base. 
4 Risk neutral investors do not care whether they receive a certain return of $100 or an uncertain return with 
an expected value of $100. 
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compensates for the reduced expected return. Under commonly used assumptions of risk 
Devereux and Freeman (1991), claims that an allowance at the risk-free rate should make the 
system neutral. 
Applying the notional interest to debt 
The allowance for corporate equity implies that an estimated cost of equity can be deducted, 
not the actual cost of equity. In a conventional tax system, interest payments are deductible. 
Interest payments are not an estimated cost of debt but the actual cost of debt. This means that 
the deduction depends on the interest rate set though an agreement between the lender and the 
borrower. One could argue that debt holders should be treated in the exact same way to ensure 
neutrality and to avoid inflated interest payments. The value of outstanding debt should be 
calculated and be multiplied by the same notional interest rate as the equity base. By using the 
same notional interest rate on debt as on equity, investors can be kept from lending to 
companies at inflated rates instead of purchasing equity. However it is important to note that a 
company is owned by its shareholders who are entitled to all assets and income streams after 
the company has paid off its debts. Therefore, any excessive interest payments will be at the 
expense of the companies’ shareholders. When lenders and shareholders are the same, a close 
company problem exists, this problem is relevant under conventional tax systems as well and 
there is typically legislation in place to avoid this phenomenon. In most cases, interest 
payments are a good measure of the actual cost of debt while the notional return would only 
be an approximation. It is also administratively attractive and practical to keep a system that is 
already in place and functioning (Devereux and Freeman 1991). 
Interaction with personal taxation: 
To obtain a system that is neutral as a whole, the personal tax must be neutral. In most 
countries, capital gains taxes are levied at realization. Taxation of capital gains is delayed 
when dividends are not paid out, which implies that retained earnings can be a cheaper source 
of finance than new equity. There are ways to handle this distortion, reduced tax rates on 
dividends or imputation systems for example5. These systems can only partially undo the 
problem because of differing personal tax rates. To truly correct the distortions of the personal 
income tax, changes need to be made in the personal income tax system (Devereux and 
Freeman 1991). 
                                                          
5 An imputation system is in place to avoid double taxation of dividends. The shareholder does not have to pay 
taxes on dividends when the company has already paid income taxes on it. 
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Treatment of pre-existing equity 
The transition to an ACE should not be too painful since the bulk of the tax base remains the 
same. The biggest change is that the value of the equity base needs to be calculated. A 
decision has to be made on whether to include pre-existing equity or only new equity. 
Incentives are the same regardless what choice is made. If only new equity is included, the 
transition will be cheaper but it also creates a wedge between old and new equity and 
legislation would be required to prevent tax-avoidance 6. This would complicate the system 
and part of the saved revenue would have to be used for enforcement. Devereux and Freeman 
(1991) think that the easiest would be to use some value relating to the book value of assets or 
the tax written down value of assets (net of debt). 
Profit shifting 
The ACE eliminates the incentive for debt shifting, which removes the need for anti-
avoidance measures like thin-capitalisation rules. The incentive for transfer pricing 
manipulation remains and is determined by the difference between the statutory corporate tax 
rate and the marginal profits from foreign and domestic jurisdictions. If the ACE were 
financed by an increase in the corporate tax rate, this would have effects on transfer pricing 
manipulation incentives. It would also reduce multinationals’ investment in the country. 
If rents (pure profits) are mobile, a source-based corporate tax with an ACE allowance will 
distort corporate investment decisions at the extensive margin (the choice of location). If the 
domestic corporate tax rate is high, the ACE allowance might not be enough to keep 
multinationals with high mobile rents in the country. When rents are immobile because of 
certain natural resources, well-educated population or infrastructure for example, a source-
based tax can be sued without distorting investment at the extensive margin (Sørensen 2010). 
2.3 Alternative reforms 
2.3.1 Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) 
The CBIT implies that the deductibility of interest payments is abolished. This reform makes 
the tax base larger and therefore allows for a reduction of the corporate tax rate. This is 
desirable since the marginal dead weight loss rises with the tax rate, but also for competitive 
reasons (Gruber 2010). The reform would also encourage firms to reduce their leverage, 
which reduces the probability of default. At the same time, the CBIT increases the cost of 
                                                          
6 A company could completely liquidate, selling old funds only to reform by issuing new equity, replacing old 
equity with new equity hence benefitting from the allowance 
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capital, which increases the probability of default so the result depends on which effect is the 
strongest. The statutory tax rate is decreased but choices such as investment and location 
choices are more sensitive to the effective marginal and average tax rate, which include 
elements of the tax base, and could therefore increase. A difficulty similar to the one of the 
ACE exists; the government must decide on how to treat pre-existing debt and shareholders’ 
gains from selling equity.  
The CBIT does not have the desired neutrality feature of the ACE. The debt bias is eliminated 
but normal profits are taxed, when interest payments and dividends cannot be deducted they 
are taxed with the normal profit. This implies that the effective marginal tax rate on new 
investment is not zero under a CBIT and taxation can distort investment decisions. If rents are 
immobile it implies macroeconomic losses but if rents are mobile it can create 
macroeconomic benefits since a CBIT, which shifts taxation from rent to normal returns will 
attract rent making companies (Fatica, Hemmelgarn and Nicodème 2012).   
2.3.2 Allowance for Corporate Capital (ACC) 
The ACC was originally proposed by Boadway and Bruce (1984). Their proposal is what 
Devreux and Freeman (1991) based their ACE proposal on and some similarities are evident. 
Boadway and Bruce (1984) suggested that the capital cost could be deducted each tax period. 
This sounds much like an ACE but the difference is that the ACC removes the deductibility of 
interest and replaces it with an allowance of the normal return applied to the book value of the 
company’s capital. Since it removes the deductibility of interest payments but at the same 
time introduces an allowance for the cost of capital (both debt and finance) it can be seen as a 
combination of the CBIT and the ACE although the ACC was suggested before both of the 
other reforms. 
2.3.3 Thin-Capitalisation rules 
Thin capitalisation refers to when a company is financed with a high level of debt relative to 
equity. Thin capitalisation rules imply that a company that has too much debt compared to 
equity will be denied deductions for part of its interest payments or that a part of interest 
payments will be reclassified as a dividends (Finansdepartementet 2011). Two approaches 
exist; determining a maximum amount of debt for which interest payments are deductible or 
determining a maximum amount of interest that can be deducted based on the ratio of interest 
and some other variable.  
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The arm’s length approach implies that the maximum amount of debt that interest can be 
deducted for is equal to the amount of debt that a third party would be willing to lend to it. 
This approach is tailored for each case, which removes asymmetrical treatment but also 
requires a lot of work from the tax authorities. A ratio approach can be based on the debt 
equity ratio for example. Ghana and Canada use the 2:1 debt to equity ratio. Other ratios can 
also be used. The ratio approach is simple to implement and does not require much resources 
from the tax authorities but they might not always take all factors of the economic reality into 
account (OECD 2012). 
 
Figure 2 
Figure 2 shows an example of the ratio approach. Assume that country A has thin 
capitalisation rules using the debt-equity ratio of 2:1. Assume further that company A 
establishes a subsidiary (company B in country B) with an investment of $ 10. Company A 
lends 90 $ to company B. Company B now has equity of $ 10 and equity of $ 90, the 
company makes a profit of $15. The interest rate is 10 % so company B pays $ 9 in interest 
payments to company A. The remaining taxable profit is $ 6 but because of the thin 
capitalisation rules, the company can only deduct interest payments made for 2 × $ 10 = $ 20 
of debt. The interest payment for $ 20 of debt is $ 2. The taxable profit will be equal to $ 15 - 
$ 2 = $ 13. 
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2.3.4 Earnings-stripping rules 
Earnings-stripping rules are similar to the thin capitalization rules; it is another way to limit 
interest deductibility. The deductibility of interest payments depends on the ratio of interest 
paid to the income it is paid out from. Interest deductibility is limited when net interest 
expenses exceed a certain percentage of EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest Taxes 
Depreciation and Amortisation). EBITDA is a measure of the profit before it has been 
adjusted for taxes, interest deductions, depreciation and amortisation. If net interest expenses 
exceed a certain percentage of this, deductibility is limited (Fatica, Hemmelgarn and 
Nicodème 2012). Italy and Germany implemented Earnings-stripping rules in 2008. 
 
Figure 2 (again) 
The same figure and example as for the thin capitalisation rules will be used to illustrate the 
earnings-stripping approach. Company B has made EBITDA of $ 15, $ 9 are paid as interest 
to company A. Taxable profit is equal to $ 6. If deduction is limited to 30 % of EBITDA, 
deductions are limited to 0.3 × $ 15 = $ 4.5. Taxable profits become $ 15 - $ 4.5 = $ 10.5. 
2.3.5 Cash flow corporate income tax 
The cash flow tax is neutral with respect to financial and investment decisions. The basic 
principle is to levy a tax on the net cash flow to the company, generated from its real business 
activities. The tax base thus becomes the difference between the income generated from sales 
of goods and services and the costs for goods and services used in the production process. 
Since the tax is not based on the profit or loss account but on the cash flows, there is no need 
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for inflation adjustments or for constructing a true measure of depreciation. Deductions for 
financing of investments are not allowed; the current deductibility of interest payments would 
be removed under a cash flow tax. Instead a first-year depreciation allowance of a 100 % is 
introduced, this is called immediate expensing. The debt equity bias is removed under a cash 
flow tax (King 1987).  
The cash flow tax does not distort investment decisions since immediate expensing implies 
that the government subsidises investment at the same rate as it taxes profits. The cost of any 
project will be reduced by the same fraction as the future benefits will be taxed. The result is 
that any project worth undertaking in the absence of taxation should be worth undertaking 
when taxes are accounted for. For this to hold, the company must have sufficient taxable 
profits so that the allowance can be used to offset current tax liabilities or the losses must be 
allowed to be carried forward with an interest rate mark-up since it is unlikely that the 
government would make large negative tax payments to firms that acquire capital (King 
1987). 
3. ACE reforms in practice 
After a more general explanation of the debt equity bias and reforms that could eliminate or 
reduce it, I will now focus on practical experiences of the ACE. The reforms implemented in 
Belgium, Croatia, Brazil and Italy, and the evaluations that have been made will be described 
in this section.  
3.1 Belgium 
The Belgian ACE variant was introduced in 2006 and is close to the reform proposed by 
Devereux and Freeman (1991), explained earlier in the paper. The base of the Belgian system 
is the book value of equity with some adjustments made. The notional interest rate is set 
annually and is equal to the average return of a 10-year linear state bond two years prior to the 
current fiscal year. The system is called notional interest (intérêts notionnels). The equity used 
to calculate the equity tax shield is the shareholders’ equity (some items are subtracted to 
avoid double deductions and abuse). The equity from the opening balance sheet for the 
taxable period is adjusted for the net tax value of own shares, non-portfolio participants and 
share issued by investment companies producing taxable revenues. Net equity assigned to 
foreign permanent establishments or property rights is subtracted along with the net book 
value of tangible fixed assets (for which costs unreasonably exceed professional needs or 
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investment that has not been made to produce regular income). Tax free evaluation gains and 
capital subsidies are also subtracted.  Equity deductions are allowed from taxable income, not 
on the actual equity cost (return to shareholders) but on an estimated equity cost (the notional 
return). After the introduction of the ACE both equity and debt finance reduce taxable 
income, providing corporate tax shields. Capital gains are generally not taxed at the personal 
level (Deloitte 2014). Therefore the Belgian system achieves neutrality as a whole. 
Aspects particular to Belgium’s ACE 
The Belgian system replaced the coordination centre regime. The coordination centre regime 
attracted multinationals by offering favourable tax treatment for their subsidiaries offering 
business services and financial services to other companies within the same group. The 
regime was not compatible with the European Stat Aid legislation and thus had to be 
abolished. In order to provide multinationals with a favourable tax treatment in accordance 
with EU legislation, Belgium introduced an ACE system. As the ACE narrows the tax base, it 
is often suggested that the statutory tax rate should be increased to collect the lost revenue. 
The Belgian ACE replaced an already beneficial tax treatment; this was probably an important 
reason for why the statutory rate was unchanged after the reform.  
Evaluation 
Princen (2011) analyses the implementation of the Belgian ACE using a diff-in-diff 
regression to measure how tax shields affects firms’ capital structure7. She estimates that the 
debt tax shield results in 2-7 % higher leverage than what would be the case under tax 
neutrality; the debt tax shield affects the capital structure of companies. She also finds a 
stronger impact for large companies than for small and medium sized companies. Princen 
(2011) suggests that a possible reason for this is that small firms are typically younger; their 
credit constraint makes them less responsive to equity incentives. Since one of the aims 
(although not official) of the ACE was to provide benefits that would make it attractive for 
multinationals’ coordination centres to stay in Belgium after the abolition of the coordination 
centre regime, it is positive that big multinational companies seem to be favoured.  
The tax relief for the corporate sector without a resulting boost of employment or increased 
investment has not been very popular with the public (Princen 2011). The lack of employment 
                                                          
7 She compares a treatment group of Belgian companies with a control group of first French, then German 
companies before and after the reform. 
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and investment effects could be associated with the treatment of pre-existing equity; 
companies are not required to create new investment to benefit from the allowance.  
3.2 Croatia 
The base of the Croatian system was the book value of equity; the adjustments made are 
described below. This means that the Croatian system did not create a tax wedge between old 
and new equity and could lead to similar problems as in Belgium. The notional interest rate 
was set at 5 % and increased with inflation of industrial products8. The ACE was introduced 
in 1994 and was part of a broader reform of the Croatian profit tax. The reform was built on 
the principle that taxation should be levied on consumption instead of income. The three main 
pillars of the system were a broad base VAT, a personal income tax that exempted dividends, 
interest and capital gains and a profit tax only levied on the equity income above the level of 
the imputed normal return.  
 
The calculation of the tax base was based on the change in the firm’s book value of equity.  
New equity contributions are subtracted, dividends paid and other profit distributions added 
back to obtain the profit or loss made in the accounting period (the tax base). New equity 
subscribed during the period does not reflect earnings generated in the company, which is 
why they were not included in the tax base. Dividends however, do represent earnings 
generated and were therefore added back. Adjustments were made for depreciation above the 
maximum rate, excessive interest payments and expenditure for other than business purposes. 
Revenues and expenditure from shares in other firms were not part included in the profit. The 
notional interest rate was applied to the book value of equity. If the tax base calculated was 
negative, losses could be carried forward for five years with an interest mark-up added (at the 
notional interest rate). After adjustments had been made, remaining profits were taxed at 35 
%.  
Personal taxation 
As mentioned in the beginning, part of the Croatian reform was to exempt dividends and 
capital gains at the personal level. Since the Croatian ACE kept the deductibility of interest 
payments and allowed a deduction of the notional return the system was neutral at the 
corporate level. The exemption of capital gains and interest receipts made the tax system 
neutral as a whole, this is consistent with the original idea of Devereux and Freeman (1991).  
                                                          
8 In Croatia, it was called the protective interest rate but to make the paper more understandable, I will refer to 
it as the notional interest rate. 
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Evaluation 
Keen and King (2002) describes the experience of the Croatian ACE reform, they explain 
how the system functioned and discusses different critical views of the Croatian system. After 
its introduction in 1994, revenues rose sharply but since the whole system was restructured at 
the same time it is difficult to attribute this increase only to the ACE. The post-reform revenue 
level was only slightly lower than the average of the EU and Central and Eastern European 
countries. This can be taken as a sign that firms were not taxed too harsh or too kindly. 
The risk-free rate is often argued to be the most appropriate rate; it is normally approximated 
with the government security rate (like in Belgium). In Croatia, financial markets were too 
fragmented so there was no obvious choice for a risk-free rate. The authors think that the 
choice of 5 % was not obviously too low nor obviously too high, a rather good approximation. 
When eliminating the debt bias, capital-intensive companies are no longer favoured9. Some 
critics claim that large and state-owned or previously state-owned enterprises were overvalued 
and thus benefitted from a notional interest deduction above the appropriate level. Companies 
that are over-valued do in fact benefit from mismeasured tax liabilities for a few periods but 
the benefit gradually disappears when old assets are written down and new assets replace 
them. Mismeasurement of tax liabilities does not distort investment in a permanent way but it 
gives the firm a windfall cash-flow profit10. The authors state that a windfall profit like this 
would have been expected and taken into account when a state-owned firm was privatized. 
They also argue that even though they found some possible evidence of overvaluation (low 
rate of return relative to equity), this is fixed through revaluation of the assets, not through 
changes in the tax system. 
A concern that is often raised regarding the ACE is that the tax payments in this system might 
not be taken into consideration in tax treaties with other countries with double taxation as an 
effect (which would discourage investment). In Croatia no evidence of related problems were 
found, even without a tax treaty, there was no problem for U.S. investors getting credit reliefs 
for the tax paid. Foreign investment in Croatia does not seem to have declined, as it is higher 
than most of its neighbouring countries’ foreign investment levels. 
The biggest issue of any ACE type reform is the lost revenue. Keen and King (2002) estimate 
that the deduction reduced the profit base by roughly one third; abolishing the deduction 
                                                          
9 Capital-intensive firms can borrow more easily since they can use their capital as collateral. 
10 A windfall gain is an unexpected profit that arises from fortunate circumstances. 
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could generate twice as much revenue. However this is probably an overestimation since 
some of the investment never would have taken place under a higher marginal effective tax 
rate. Another problem was that the calculation of the deduction could get rather complex in 
Croatia. The complexity was mostly due to the fact that the interest rate hade to be applied to 
the relevant balance sheet changes every month11. 
For the desired properties of the ACE to hold, the notional interest rate must be set at the right 
level but even if it is set at the wrong level Keen and King (2002) claim that it still might be 
better than the conventional system which implies a zero rate (allowing no deduction for 
protective interest). The degree of non-neutrality depends on the size of the difference 
between the actual and the appropriate rate of notional interest. 
In 2001 the allowance was eliminated with no clear explanation. A new government was 
elected and chose to implement a new reform, lowering the statutory rate rom 35 % to 20 % 
and eliminating the deduction. Keen and King (2002) identify the death of Franjo Tudjman in 
1999 (and the following desire for change) and the increasing tax competition in the EU as 
partial explanations for the abolition. The authors describe a rather well functioning system 
that did not leave any technical flaws in the system. They state that the Croatian ACE is both 
attractive from an analytical perspective and close enough to conventional establishments. It 
is based on commercial accounts with only a few adjustments needed.  
3.3 Italy 
Italy introduced a partial ACE system in 1997; it was called the dual income tax (DIT). The 
Italian ACE was also part of a larger reform that had two aims; financial neutrality and a 
lower statutory tax rate leading to a lower effective average tax rate. This is curious since the 
ACE narrows the tax base and hence should be accompanied by a higher statutory tax rate. 
Something else that is interesting about the Italian ACE reform is that the deductibility of 
interest payments was removed at the same time, which is the main feature of a 
Comprehensive Business Income Tax that was described in section 2. 
The ACE was partial since it did not exempt normal profits; they were just subject to a lower 
tax rate. Normal profits were taxed at 19 % and pure profits were taxed at 37 %. Exempting 
normal profits completely would imply a greater revenue loss and would probably have to be 
followed by an increase of the statutory rate. The partial ACE was part of a big reform, which 
                                                          
11 There was a reason for the frequent calculations; it reduces incentives to time transactions around certain 
dates to reduce tax liability. 
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also shifted profit taxation to a broader definition of business income, including labour costs 
and interest payments. IRAP: a flat tax levied on all types of business activities was 
introduced. Thanks to its large base, a rate of 4.25 % allowed for a reduction of the statutory 
rate from 53.2 % to 41.25 % (Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini 2001).  
The notional return started from zero and increased when new subscriptions and retained 
earnings replaced old capital12. Pre-existing equity was not included. The notional return was 
calculated by applying a notional interest rate to a measure of equity in the company (the 
equity base). The rate was set annually and depended on the market interest rate on public and 
private bonds (maximum 3 pp. above the market rate). If normal returns exceeded total profits 
the loss could be carried forward for four years (no interest rate adjustment and carry back 
were allowed). 
The equity of young companies came closer to their total capital so they got a big reduction in 
the average tax rate although the average tax rate could never go below 27 %. Many other 
companies pressured the government for faster and clearer tax reductions. This resulted in a 
change of the system in 1999; partnerships and individual firms were allowed to compute the 
normal return on the full equity stock. From 2000 corporations were allowed to multiply their 
normal return on new equity by 1.2 and in 2001 the factor was increased to 1.4. These 
changes were supposed to speed up the transition to a system where the notional return is 
applied to all equity. An increasing number of firms started “hitting the 27 % floor”, which 
partly offsets the benefit of the DIT. A removal of the minimum average tax rate was 
proposed in 2001 (Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini 2001). 
Personal taxation 
The Italian reform managed to reduce arbitrage and eliminate the discrimination between 
retention and distribution of profits. This was done by taxing the change in market value of 
portfolios and by taxing capital gains and losses at realisation with an adjustment mechanism 
to eliminate the advantage of deferral. If assets were not listed on regulated markets, the 
realised gain was proportionally spread out over the period of possession. When the sum of 
capital gain was negative, the shareholder got a tax credit that could be used to compensate 
for other capital gain tax or be carried forward for a maximum of four years. 
                                                          
12 The notional return was called ordinary income in Italy but for consistency reasons I choose to refer to it as 
the notional return. 
 24 
Italy’s ACE was in place until 2003 but an ACE was introduced once more in 2011. The rate 
was fixed at 3 % for 2011, 2012 and 2013. From now on the rate will be determined each year 
by a ministerial decree based on the value of Italian treasury bonds. The rate can be increased 
by up to 3 % to compensate for a higher business risk (Deloitte Global Services Limited 
2012). Italy has once more chosen to apply the notional interest rate only to new equity but it 
seems as if it is more of a full scale ACE, not just a lower tax rate for normal profits. At the 
personal level, the general rule is that dividends and interest receipts are taxed at 20 % 
(KPMG 2014). Neutrality is achieved with the current system. I have not found research 
papers evaluating the Italian ACE since it is mostly likely too soon to draw any conclusions 
from the reform after only three years.  
Evaluation 
Bordignon, Giannini and Panteghini (2001) find that the cost of capital was halved for equity 
after the reform, which can be attributed to the abolition of ILOR and the introduction of the 
DIT. The cost of debt financed investment increased since interest payments were no longer 
deductible and while the debt equity bias persisted, it was largely reduced. The possibility to 
multiply the normal return by 1.4 reduced the debt bias further while the minimum rate of 27 
% increased the cost of capital both for equity and debt financed investments13. 
The average effective tax rate decreased in Italy after the reform but not as much as the 
effective marginal tax rate. What is important is how high the rate is relative to the rates of 
other countries. They find that the Italian rate is still higher than those of most other EU 
countries14. That explains to some extent why there has been no significant effect on foreign 
investment. However, there are other non-tax wedges that are important for foreign 
investment. Italy’s heavy bureaucracy and inflexible labour market most likely have a big 
impact on how attractive the country is for foreign investment. Only tax factors are researched 
in this paper. 
3.5 Brazil 
A version of the ACE was introduced in Brazil in 1996 as part of a big reform of the corporate 
income system. The Brazilian ACE variant differs in a significant way from the Belgian and 
the Croatian system that are closer to the originally proposed ACE. The difference lies in a 
                                                          
13 Normal returns cannot benefit from the 19 % tax rate and interest payments cannot be deducted against the 
37 % rate. 
14 The authors estimate the effective average tax rate in Italy using a method suggested by Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) but when comparing it to other countries they approximate effective average tax rates using 
statutory tax rates since the average rate approaches the statutory one when profitability increases. 
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restriction that allows notional interest to be deducted only when it is paid out to shareholders; 
hence there is no deduction for retained earnings, only for dividends. The notional rate of 
return is equal to the interest rate on long-term loans (de Mooij and Devereux 2009). 
In the original ACE proposed by Devereux and Freeman (1991), the notional interest rate is 
multiplied by the company’s equity base to get the notional return. This notional return is 
deductible form the company’s taxable income. In Brazil, the system implied that firms that 
paid out dividends in excess of the notional return could deduct the full notional return as 
under any ACE. The difference form the original ACE is only relevant for firms that did not 
pay out enough dividends to reach the notional return, these firms could subsequently not take 
advantage of the full notional return. The equity increase resulting from a new investment 
increases the notional return but since the firm is already unable to benefit fully from the 
existing notional return, the increased equity does not add any benefit. These firms therefore 
face a different system. They can pay out their dividends as interest on equity and can deduct 
this from taxable income in the same way that other interest payments are deductible.  Just 
like other interest payments the interest receipt at the personal level is subject to a withholding 
tax of 15 %.  
Personal taxation 
Before the reform, only interest payments on debt were deductible at company level. 
Withholding taxes on dividends were levied at 15 % while interest receipts were taxed at 25 
% implying an opposite distortion at the personal level. A consequence of the previous tax on 
dividends was that it was more attractive for firms to finance their activities using retained 
earnings.  
The reform introduced deductibility for dividends. At the personal level, dividends were 
exempt and interest receipts were taxed at 15 %. A slight debt bias remained at the corporate 
level while dividends were favoured at the personal level. Dividends were tax-free after the 
reform but the dividends that were paid out as interest on equity were taxed as other interest 
receipts. The dividends that were paid out in excess of the notional return were tax-free at the 
personal level. 
Evaluation 
Klemm (2007) analyses the effects from the Brazilian ACE through various regressions. One 
significant result is that neutrality between sources of finance might not have been obtained 
since the notional interest rate was set too low (much lower than the bank interest rate). 
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Consequently he finds a remaining debt bias for firms that pay out dividends in excess of the 
notional return. Klemm (2007) labels those firms H type firms. The firms for which dividends 
paid do not reach the notional return are labelled L type firms. 
Companies benefitted from financing activities through debt before the reform since the cost 
of capital was lower. For H type firms this benefit is removed and for L type firms it is 
reduced. L type firms should be indifferent between using new equity or debt to finance an 
investment since both imply a similar subsidy for investment. Using retained earnings to 
finance investment was seriously discouraged. Theoretically the debt bias should have been 
eliminated from the reform but in practice, the notional interest rate was set too low. This 
means that the debt bias remained for H type firms. 
The big majority of firms in the data set did not reach the notional return. Still, dividend 
deductibility eliminates the distortion in the choice of debt or equity to finance new 
investment. The expected result would therefore be increased use of equity and decreased use 
of debt but no such results were found in the data. The reform resulted in more dividends paid 
out and the number of H type firms slowly growing. An increase in investment can also be 
seen after the reform but it is difficult to say whether this had anything to do with the effects 
on capital structure or if it was due to the lower statutory corporate tax rate, which was part of 
the reform. 
A big shortcoming with this analysis is that there were so few H type firms in the data set and 
these firms were the only ones subject to the original ACE. Klemm (2007) suggests that an 
analysis of closed companies could have reached better results but there are difficulties in 
collecting data for these firms15. Due to its shortcomings, the analysis of the Brazilian ACE 
did not show strong effects, however it did not show any negative results or big problems 
either. 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The tax system for closed companies was closer to the original ACE. 
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4 The situation in Sweden today 
This section will give an overview of Sweden’s current legislation and explain how the debt 
equity bias affects Sweden. The work of a committee gathered by the Swedish Ministry of 
Finance and their search for a remedy for the debt equity bias will be discussed. The ACE 
recommendation given by Sørensen (2010) mentioned in the beginning of the paper will also 
be explained in more detail. 
4.1 Current Swedish legislation 
The Swedish Ministry of Finance issued a memorandum on more efficient interest deductions 
in 2012 that explains the current legislation and makes suggestions on how to improve it 
(Finansdepartementet 2012).  The main rule in the Swedish income tax act is that interest 
payments are fully deductible. In 2009 an exception to the main rule was introduced. The new 
legislation limits the deduction of interest payment for internally funded acquisitions. The aim 
is to prevent tax schemes where internally funded acquisitions of ownership rights within a 
community of interest are used in order to receive beneficial tax treatment. The new 
legislation is applicable when a loan within a community of interest is used to acquire 
ownership rights within the same community of interest16. For cases like this, deductions of 
interest payments are not allowed.  
To prevent tax evasion through the use of external loans, there are two main rules. The first 
rule states that deductions cannot be made if the external debt is paid off and then completely 
or partially replaced by internal debt. The second rule is that deductions are not allowed if the 
external debt is matched by a claim that another company within the community of interest 
has on the external company. This rule is only applicable when the loan is made to acquire 
ownership rights within the community of interest. 
The ten per cent rule implies that deductibility of interest depends on how the recipient of the 
interest payment is taxed. A hypothetical test is made to determine the level of taxation that 
the recipient faces. If the recipient is located abroad, the classification is made according to 
the foreign legal system. Deductions are allowed if the income generated from the interest 
payment is taxed at 10 % or more17. “Ventilen”, or the ventilator, is the name of the rule that 
allows deductions to be made regardless of the taxation of the recipient if the debt is 
                                                          
16 A company is considered to be in community of interest with another company if it has direct or indirect 
influence on that company or if the two companies are under the same management.  
17 When making this decision profits and losses from the normal operations are not taken into account, the 
interest payment is seen as if it was the company’s only income 
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commercially motivated. Sound commercial considerations should lie behind the relationship 
that is assessed.  
The Swedish government asked the tax authorities to follow the evolution of tax avoidance 
using deductions of interest throughout 2009, 2010 and 2011. They found that intercompany 
indebtedness is often used for both internal and external acquisitions of subsidiaries. There are 
big possibilities to structure the corporation and debt so that deductions can be made in 
Sweden while the recipient is not taxed or taxed at a very low rate. The ten per cent rule has 
had unwanted effects. Considerable interest deductions are obtained in Sweden when the 
internal claim has been placed within the group so that the ten per cent rule applies. They 
suggest that the rule should be changed or completed in order to prevent company internal 
debt establishment for tax reasons no matter if the recipient is taxed at 10 % or not. 
The enforcement works well in the areas where it is applicable but too many areas are left 
unregulated. Some of the parts left unaffected are company internal loans in order to finance 
dividend payments, acquisitions of company internal claims or capital contributions to 
subsidiaries used to acquire internal ownership rights. The many exceptions imply a heavy 
administrative burden for the Swedish tax agency. Assessments are made based on foreign 
legislation and conditions, which is difficult and requires resources (Finansdepartementet 
2012). 
The Swedish ministry of finance gathered a committee to look over the Swedish corporate tax 
system. Many of the Swedish tax laws are designed for a small and closed economy and with 
a national perspective rather than an international one. The committee’s task is to analyse the 
potential tax changes and their effects in the new global business climate.  In a closed 
economy it is easier to balance deductions in one company with taxation in the receiving 
company but in today’s global context, this is becoming increasingly difficult and the 
protection of the Swedish tax base is weakened.  
A committee directive was issued in 2011 and discusses how the Swedish tax system can 
benefit business, investment and employment (Finansdepartementet 2011). One of the issues 
discussed in the directive is the debt equity bias and the possibility to make the treatment 
more similar for the two means of funding. The committee will give a suggestion for a more 
comprehensive system, which will replace the current one and reduce the equity 
discrimination. The new legislation must be consistent with current EU law. 
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In 2008 the Swedish government presented some guidelines for the tax policies over the 
coming years and some requirements regarding the design of the Swedish tax system. After 
the proposition was accepted by the parliament it has been the starting point for tax reforms. 
The guidelines for corporate taxation are to create incentives for investment and a fast 
development of production in Sweden. One way to do this is to reduce taxation of venture 
capital in the form of equity, which is consistent with the ACE. Reforms have to be 
sustainable and consistent with EU legislation, laws have to be symmetric, simple and 
consistent regardless of the size of the company or the industry in which it operates. 
Legislation must be competitive on an international level without impairing the Swedish tax 
base. Deferred taxation and double taxation should be avoided, current legislation and tax 
treaties with other countries should be reviewed. Reforms as a whole should result in a 
simpler and more stabile system and a lower administrative burden for the companies. 
It is more and more common that firms, when acquiring external ownership rights, reduce 
their expenses through tax planning (using interest deductions). Profits from a Swedish 
company are transferred to companies in low tax jurisdictions. This type of activity is not 
limited by the legislation from 2009 since this only covers internal acquisitions. The 
committee will investigate whether the rules concerning internal acquisitions could be 
extended to include external acquisitions as well. 
The committee will research the possibility to implement an ACE, a CBIT, Thin-
capitalisation rules and other reforms they find interesting. The suggestions will be judged 
based on accuracy, predictability and how easy they can be implemented in practice. The 
effects on investment, employment, distribution of wealth and GDP should also be taken into 
account when forming an opinion. The main idea is that the changes will lead to a tax base 
broadening that will finance a reduced tax rate for corporations. It is important to offer a 
competitive tax rate compared to other EU countries. Rules concerning transfer pricing are 
also designed to fit a closed economy and need a review. When designing a tax reform the 
Swedish tax base should be protected but it should still be an attractive country to invest and 
do business in. The administrative burden for the companies and for the Swedish tax agency 
should be minimized.  
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4.2 Sørensen’s proposal 
Sørensen (2010) suggests an ACE reform for the Swedish tax system to achieve financing 
neutrality. The only thing that has changed in Sørensen’s calculation of the equity base 
compared to the original proposal by Devereux and Freeman’s (1991) is that he also subtracts 
net new equity provided to foreign branches. This is to prevent that investments that do not 
generate tax revenue in Sweden erode the Swedish tax base. Dividends received from foreign 
companies can be included in the equity base as long as they are reinvested in Sweden. This 
way, all domestic investment is included in the Swedish ACE allowance.  
Within the ACE system, firms could potentially issue new equity on the last day of the year, 
only to redeem them or pay out the revenue as dividends the next day still benefitting form the 
full ACE allowance. This implies that firms could benefit from a permanent tax relief without 
having to increase their equity finance. To prevent firms from doing this, an adjustment that 
ensures that the timing of dividends and new issues are taken into account is suggested. When 
a company tries to issue shares on the last day of the year and then redeem them the first day 
of the next year, the adjustment ensures that the ACE allowance increase by only 1/365 of the 
amount of new equity. The calculations can be studied more carefully in (Sørensen 2010). 
Choosing the right level for the notional interest rate 
The present value of an investment should not change with taxation. To ensure this, the 
notional interest rate must equal the discount rate of future ACE allowance for shareholders. 
The discount rate depends on how certain future tax savings from the ACE allowance are. The 
risk is much associated with the risk of bankruptcy, which is reflected by the rate at which a 
company can borrow, the interest rate18. Therefore that would be a good choice for the 
notional interest rate but the administrative burden from having different rates for companies 
would be too heavy. Even if the neutrality is slightly reduced by having one rate for all 
companies, Sørensen (2010) suggests that the average rate of the corporate bonds market is a 
natural benchmark (assuming well functioning and liquid corporate bonds market).  
Treatment of pre-existing equity 
Sørensen (2010) estimates the revenue loss from allowing an allowance for pre-existing 
equity as well as new equity to be limited. It does not grant a deduction for equity from 
untaxed reserves (accelerated depreciation for example), neither does it grant a deduction for 
                                                          
18 When a firm goes out of business, unutilized losses that remain cannot always be deducted against other 
taxable income. 
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shares held in other Swedish or foreign companies. He estimated the loss of tax revenue in 
Sweden to be around 10 % of corporate tax revenue in 200719. Sørensen (2010) explains the 
small Swedish ACE base by referring to multinationals having large debt-financed ownership 
in foreign companies. For ownership in a Swedish subsidiary, the negative effect on the ACE 
allowance will be offset by the positive effect of the new equity in the subsidiary but if the 
subsidiary is located in a foreign company, the aggregated ACE base is affected in a negative 
way. The small revenue loss could also be explained by a corporate income tax base 
consisting to a large extent of pure profits, which are taxed under an ACE. 
Distortions caused by the ACE 
Sørensen (2010) discusses the impact of a tax on pure profits on risk-taking. He acknowledges 
that the practical limitations of loss offsetting make it difficult to estimate the effect. There is 
a substitution and a wealth effect and they go in opposite directions. If loss offsets are very 
limited, that implies a large negative wealth effect. Losses carried forward means they can be 
saved and deducted against future income. In Sweden carrying losses forward is possible but 
there is no interest that ensures the present value of the deduction. The losses are not indexed 
and therefor lose their real value over time. Losses are not fully refundable, some losses are 
“wasted”. A way to address the issue could be to let losses offset other tax liabilities during 
the same year (like VAT etc.). This would limit the amount of losses “wasted” and give some 
of the benefits of a full refundability. In theory, the ACE should not affect private risk-taking 
but in practice it probably will, although to a smaller extent than the current system. A tax 
system that discourages risk-taking is not good for innovation, growth and investment 
although excessive risk-taking is of course not desired. 
5. Analysis 
The analysis will discuss the design of a Swedish ACE; the choice of notional interest, 
treatment of pre-existing equity and how it will be funded. I will also look at the effects that 
an ACE might have and whether these are desirable or not.  
5.1 Tax Design of a Swedish ACE 
If an ACE was to be implemented in Sweden, one of the first choices that will have to be 
made is whether the ACE allowance should be applied to pre-existing equity or not. Applying 
the allowance only to post-reform equity is cheaper for the government but firms will see the 
possibility of liquidating only to reform immediately after, taking advantage of the full 
                                                          
19 Assuming the required rate of return for investors to be 7 % (4 % risk-free rate + 3 % risk premium). 
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allowance without increasing equity. The incentives for investment will not change but the 
cash flow of the companies is affected. The government will have to spend part of the saved 
revenue on creating anti-avoidance legislation and enforcement. Brazil chose an extreme 
version by not only limiting the allowance to new equity but also only to dividends that were 
actually paid out. That makes it different form the ACE and I will not discuss this option for 
Sweden since the desired neutrality properties are not fully obtained. The Italian ACE variant 
only allowed deductions for new equity. Since Italy relaxed its restrictions in 2000 and 2001 
to allow the equity base to be multiplied first by 1.2 and then by 1.4, to speed up the transition 
to an ACE applicable to the full equity base, one could draw the conclusion that starting with 
an initial equity base of zero was a bad idea. The multiplication by 1.4 was eliminated soon 
after though so it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Italy introduced an ACE reform once 
more in 2011, choosing again to limit the allowance to new equity, which can be seen as a 
sign that they thought it worked well. Belgium applied the allowance to pre-existing equity as 
well as new equity. The reform seems to be functioning well but, as Princen (2011) suggested, 
the unpopularity with the public probably has something to do with the tax benefit given to 
corporations without any resulting boost of employment or investment. The Croatian ACE 
functioned in a similar way as the Belgian reform. Keen and King (2002) estimated the 
revenue loss from the reform to be large, reducing the profit tax base by one third, unlike 
Sørensen (2010) who approximated the loss to be around 10 % of corporate tax revenues. He 
attributes this to the fact that no allowance is granted for untaxed reserves (such as accelerated 
depreciation) or for shares held in other Swedish or foreign companies. The revenues that the 
government can collect depends much on if Swedish companies are making pure profits. I 
have not researched how much pure profits Swedish companies make in this paper. 
Theoretically, the incentives are the same whether the reform applies to pre-existing equity or 
not but a reform that only applies to new equity will probably give investment an extra boost.  
Devereux and Freeman (1991) and their original ACE proposal speak for using the risk-free 
market interest rate since this should reflect the opportunity cost of investment. When the 
notional interest rate differs from the opportunity cost of equity this creates non-neutrality. To 
what extent depends on how big the difference is between the notional interest rate and the 
“appropriate” rate. The notional interest rate ensures that cash return to shareholders is taxed 
and equity that shareholders put into the company is deductible. The shareholder will try to 
maximize this net flow and when only the net flow is taxed, decision-making is not affected. 
 33 
For this to hold, the ACE allowance must be certain so that the shareholder values it at the 
risk-free rate. 
It can be seen that countries have listened to this when implementing their various ACE 
variants. Belgium uses the average government bond rate (from the year preceding the current 
fiscal year by two years). Italy set their rate depending on the market interest rate on public 
and private bonds. In Croatia, capital markets were not well functioning enough so they could 
not use the government bond rate. Sørensen (2010) speaks for using the average interest rate 
of the corporate bonds market assuming well functioning and liquid corporate bonds market. 
His argument for this is that the ACE allowance is not certain in Sweden due to the risk of 
bankruptcy but also due to the fact that the deductions carried forward lose value over time. 
The losses are not indexed and therefor lose their real value over time since there is no interest 
mark-up to ensure the remaining present value. Losses are not fully refundable and some 
losses are “wasted”. 
In Sweden it should be possible to use the government bond rate since it is seen as almost 
completely risk-free. Using corporate bonds is a slightly more difficult option. The Swedish 
corporate bonds market is small and not very liquid (Gunnarsdottir and Lindh, 2011). Support 
functions of the market are underdeveloped but it is likely to expand and develop in the future 
(Mårtensson and Åström 2013). If Sweden’s corporate bond market is not liquid or well 
functioning enough the government bond rate might be a better idea even though the ACE 
allowance is not completely certain. 
How should the reform be financed? 
Since the ACE narrows the tax base, the reform requires financing to be revenue neutral. A 
very common argument against the ACE is that the statutory corporate tax rate has to be 
increased in order to make up for the lost revenue. This argument probably stems from the 
original proposal from Devereux and Freeman (1991), where they estimate how much the 
corporate tax rate would have to be increased to finance an ACE reform. But that is not the 
only option; the ACE can be financed in many other ways. The European commission states 
that the taxes that are the least detrimental to growth are consumption taxes, recurrent 
property taxes and environmental taxes (European Commission 2013). Therefore I will 
discuss the possibility to raise taxes in these areas to finance an ACE reform. The Swedish 
committee elected to propose a solution to the debt equity bias has been given directions to 
finance the chosen reform within the corporate sector’s taxation so these alternatives might 
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not be on the agenda but they are still interesting to look into. I will of course also discuss the 
originally proposed option of increasing the statutory corporate tax rate.  
Statutory corporate tax rate 
Since 2000, the statutory corporate tax rate has decreased in every EU country except for 
Hungary and Malta and the trend is likely to continue20. The average corporate tax rate in the 
EU was 35.5 % in the mid nineties and had dropped to 23.5 % in 2013 (European 
Commission 2013). This is most likely a sign of tax competition between member states, 
competing for multinationals’ profits and business. Considering the continuous decrease of 
corporate tax rates in EU countries, it is not plausible that a country would implement an ACE 
reform funded through increased corporate tax rates. None of the countries described in the 
previous section financed their ACE through an increased statutory corporate tax rate 
although in Croatia the abolition of the ACE allowed for a big drop in the statutory rate.  
Devereux and de Mooij (2011) state that the effect of an ACE depends on the initial corporate 
tax rate and base of a country; welfare gains are higher for countries with high initial tax rates. 
Sweden’s corporate tax rate is a little bit lower than the EU average so under this assumption 
the welfare gains from a unilateral implementation of an ACE should not be large. Sweden’s 
welfare gain estimated through their model is estimated to approximately 0.7 % of GDP when 
the ACE is financed through lump sum transfers. When the ACE is financed by an increase in 
the statutory rate the welfare gain turns negative while the CBIT reform seems very 
beneficial, generating a welfare gain of 1.9 % of GDP (when the statutory rate is lowered after 
the abolition of interest deductions). Devereux and de Mooij (2011) find a very high welfare 
gain for Sweden from a coordinated ACE reform, when all EU countries implement an ACE 
and finance the reform through increased corporate tax rates. The ACE implies welfare gains 
both when it is financed through lump sum transfers and when all countries increase their tax 
rates but not when Sweden unilaterally implements an ACE and increases the statutory rate. 
From this result it can be seen that the welfare loss from a unilateral ACE implementation 
originates from the loss of competitiveness relative to other countries and the following 
international spill over effects. It can be discussed which tax rate is the most important one, 
the statutory rate, the marginal rate or the average rate. I will leave this discussion for another 
paper. 
                                                          
20 Malta has kept its statutory rate of 35 % throughout the period and Hungary has seen and increase of 1 
percentage point since 2000. 
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Consumption taxes 
Increasing consumption taxes is the easiest way to raise revenue since its base is so broad. A 
rise in consumption taxes will increase prices and could create inflation in the short 
run(European Commission 2013). Given Sweden’s current situation of zero inflation or even 
deflation, possible inflation is not something that should be alarming. Sweden has a standard 
VAT rate of 25 % and some goods and services are subject to reduced rates. One possibility is 
to raise the standard VAT rate; since it has such a broad base a small increase would generate 
big revenue. However, it should be noted that Sweden already has one of the highest VAT 
rates in Europe. It can be argued that consumption taxes put the poor at a disadvantage since 
they often have to spend all their money on consumption while richer individuals can save 
money (savings are untaxed). But then again, savings are just postponed consumption. 
Another option is to remove reduced rates, moving towards a flat tax on consumption. A 
uniform 25 % rate for all goods and services would make tax evasion more difficult at the 
same time as generating more revenue. It might be difficult to remove the reduced rates since 
they are typically applied to goods and services for which more consumption is desired in 
society because of positive externalities. These goods are for example books, vegetables, 
museum entrance fees or other cultural activities. Even if the goods facing reduced rates 
would just become subject to standard taxation it would probably be perceived as an extra tax 
levied on these goods. 
Recurrent property taxes 
Increased taxation on immovable property will not raise as much revenue as increased 
taxation on consumption but it is a reliable source of income for the government and the 
distortionary effects are rather small. In Sweden, all interest payments are deductible at the 
personal level (Skatteverket 2014). The deduction of interest payments on mortgages was 
previously countered by a proportional property tax but in 2008 the tax was replaced by a low 
fee (Finanspolitiska Rådet 2008). The result of this has been that more investments are 
channelled into the properties than what would be optimal in the absence of taxation, which is 
inefficient. The removal of the proportional property tax was financed by an increased tax rate 
on the capital gain received when selling property. This creates a lock in effect but I will not 
describe this in further detail in this paper. According to the uniformity principle and 
neutrality principle followed in Sweden; equal income should be taxed the same way and 
individuals’ choices should not be distorted by taxation. This is consistent with the ACE 
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reform and would also fit well with a reform of recurrent property taxation. In today’s 
globalized world, taxation of immobile factors is attractive for tax authorities. 
High indebtedness of Swedish households has been pointed out as a matter of concern by the 
European Commission (2013). Low recurrent property tax, deductibility of interest payments 
and low amortization requirements channel makes it attractive to invest in property. The 
commission states that a drop in prices in the housing market or increased interest rates on 
mortgage payments exposes households to big risk. They recommend Sweden to reduce the 
debt bias and the deductibility of interest payments. There is technically a subsidy for 
investment in property now and it is difficult to say what effects a removal of the subsidy 
would have on existing investments. 
Environmental taxes 
The third area recommended by the EU for raising extra tax revenue is environmental 
taxation. Environmental taxes on consumption are particularly beneficial. These taxes 
generate revenue but they also have other benefits for society; they help reduce climate 
change and reach environmental targets. Environmental taxes have a relatively narrow tax 
base and can therefore not be expected to generate as much revenue as the consumption or the 
recurrent property tax. Sweden is not one of the countries pointed out by the European 
Commission as being able to boost tax revenue from environmental taxes, probably because 
Sweden is often ahead when it comes to environmental topics (European Commission 2013). 
Development in other EU countries 
Several reforms have taken place in the EU during 2012 and 2013, many of them have aimed 
to reduce the debt bias through thin-capitalisation rules or earnings-stripping rules (European 
Commission 2013). Thin-capitalisation and earnings-stripping rules are more in line with the 
CBIT reform, which owes much of its popularity to the possibility of a lower statutory 
corporate tax rate. In the committee directive from the Swedish ministry of finance (2011) it 
was also indicated that a reform that broadened the tax base and lowered the rate would most 
likely be the one chosen (although nothing was decided in advance). These facts combined 
with the high welfare gains found by Devereux and de Mooiij (2011) suggests that Sweden 
will be more attracted to a CBIT type reform. The current legislation is also approaching thin-
capitalisation rules through various rules on when interest deductions can and cannot be used. 
In despite of this, the ACE is not completely out of the question. Belgium chose to implement 
the ACE in 2006 and now Italy implemented an ACE once more in 2011 after the abolition in 
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2003. Sørensen’s (2010) suggestion in also suggests that the ACE is not off the agenda, but 
instead a relevant reform to research more closely. 
5.2 Effects of an ACE 
Eliminating tax avoidance 
One might ask if it is so obvious that the debt bias should be eliminated. As mentioned in the 
introduction, the use of debt finance does have some positive aspects although the negative 
ones seem to be greater. The removal of the debt bias will eliminate tax avoidance through 
debt shifting but it will not remove the possibilities of transfer pricing manipulation. After the 
removal of the debt bias, transfer-pricing manipulation might increase since the option of debt 
shifting is removed. The committee is also supposed to review the legislation on transfer 
pricing manipulation. But is it a good idea to eliminate every way of tax avoidance? 
Multinationals are the ones who are primarily taking advantage of both debt shifting and 
transfer pricing manipulation since they have the possibility to shift debt to subsidiaries in 
other countries. If the possibility of tax avoidance was removed in Sweden, multinationals 
with mobile production factors might decide to move their business elsewhere. Sweden would 
not only lose the existing tax revenue but also job opportunities. At the same time, the 
reduced cost of capital for equity finance following the ACE reform makes business in 
Sweden more attractive for multinationals. 
Benefitting capital-intensive industries or not 
The debt bias benefits capital-intensive industries, as explained in the section about Croatia’s 
ACE reform. Therefore a removal of the debt bias will benefit small firms. Smaller firms are 
often younger and will have to rely on equity to a larger extent so an equity tax shield is in 
their interest. Considering these facts, it is strange that both Belgium and Italy have results 
showing that the large firms are the ones changing their capital structure the most. Princen 
(2011) mentions the possibility that large firms are more responsive to tax incentives. This 
could be due to the fact that a large firm might have employees that are analysing the best 
way to organise taxation and capital structure, while small firms have to keep focus on the 
main business. Another reason that could explain why small firms are not changing their 
capital structure as much is that they are already using equity. Larger firms will have an 
incentive to shift from debt to equity. Small firms are already using equity so the change in 
their capital structure will not be as large. 
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The equity tax shield is only relevant for companies that can raise equity, corporations.  In 
Sweden the minimum capital requirement to start a corporation is 50 000 SEK 
(aktiebolagslagen 1 kap 5 §). The requirement is rather low and the equity tax shield could 
encourage more firms to become corporations.  More firms financed through equity rather 
than debt will probably decrease macro-economic fluctuations. 
Competitive advantage 
While Sweden is a big producer of paper, iron and steel for example, Sweden’s perhaps 
largest competitive advantage today is knowledge and innovation. Sweden cannot compete 
with the cheap labour in other countries and even though productivity growth has been 
particularly strong in manufacturing in the last decade and Swedish multinationals are 
competitive, a large part of operations is located abroad. Sweden ranks high when innovation 
is measured but the amount of companies entering and exiting the Swedish market relative to 
the existing stock of companies is low. That implies what OECD has also pointed out, that 
Sweden’s level of entrepreneurship does not match its high rankings in innovation.  Making 
equity finance cheaper is a way to encourage entrepreneurship, start-ups and innovation, 
which is an area where Sweden has to focus in order to sustain its current competitiveness in 
the futures (entreprenorskapsforum.se). 
Neutrality for whom? 
For the ACE system to be neutral it is important that the taxation is symmetric both on 
company level and at the personal level. The Swedish tax system is not symmetric at the 
moment; at the personal level dividends and interest receipts are taxed at the uniform rate of 
30 % (Skatteverket 2014) but at company level interest payments are exempt while dividends 
are not. If the ACE was introduced, neutrality would be achieved but it can be debated 
whether corporations are the ones who should receive the tax benefit. Interest receipts and 
dividends could also be exempted at the personal level, which would have similar effects.  
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6 Conclusion 
In most mature economies, the cost of debt is deductible while the cost of equity is not. This 
is often referred to as the debt equity bias or the debt bias and it creates an incentive for firms 
to take on more debt than what would be optimal in absence of this discrimination between 
sources of funding. The debt bias is problematic for a number of reasons; besides increasing 
systemic risk a welfare loss is created due to sub-optimal investment level, funds invested in 
assets that are not the most productive ones or costs resulting from tax planning and tax 
avoidance. 
 
An implementation of an ACE in Sweden is a possible solution to the debt equity bias. The 
reform does not require any major changes to current accounting practices; it is compatible 
with established conventions. The only big change is that companies would have to calculate 
their notional return. They will do this by multiplying a notional interest rate with their equity 
base (total equity or only post-reform equity). The rate chosen would most likely be the 
government bond interest rate. It is the method suggested in the original proposal by 
Devereux and Freeman (1991) and it is also the rate chosen for the Belgian reform. The 
average corporate bond rate is also an interesting alternative but it depends on the liquidity 
and the functioning of the Swedish corporate bonds markets, a market that is still rather small. 
There are both positive and negative aspects with applying the allowance to both new and pre-
existing equity. Only applying it to new equity is cheaper for the government but it also 
creates a need for anti-avoidance measures to make sure that firms do not liquidate and 
immediately reform, taking advantage of the full allowance. The ACE has several attractive 
neutrality features; by allowing the cost of debt and equity to be deducted, only economic 
rents are taxed. This implies that the effective marginal tax rate of new investment is zero and 
that the scale of investment is not distorted. The ACE eliminates the incentive for debt 
shifting and neutralises the choice of source of funding.  
 
Implementing an ACE requires funding since it narrows the tax base. In the original proposal 
by Devereux and Freeman (1991), the ACE was to be funded through an increase of the 
statutory corporate tax rate. This does not seem like a plausible solution in the climate of 
increasing tax competition in Europe. The European Commission identifies consumption 
taxes, recurrent property taxes and environmental taxes as the least detrimental ones. While an 
increased VAT or elimination of reduced VAT rates would be an efficient alternative it might 
be difficult to implement in practice. The interest deductibility for mortgages combined with 
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low fees and low amortization requirements channels too much investment into the property 
market so a reintroduction of the proportional recurrent property tax would most likely 
improve efficiency. The revenues from this could go to the funding of an ACE. Sweden is 
usually ahead when it comes to environmental taxation so increasing environmental taxes 
even more would probably not raise enough money to fund the ACE. It could contribute 
though and environmental taxes reduce the negative externalities from emissions. The 
committee gathered by the Swedish Ministry of finance to give a suggestion on how to reduce 
the debt equity bias in Sweden is meant to finance the suggested reform within the area of 
corporate tax rates. This means that only the option of the statutory tax rate is under 
consideration. If the statutory tax rate has to be increased to fund an ACE, the chances of a 
Swedish ACE are seriously reduced. There has been a steady decrease of corporate tax rates 
in the EU over the last two decades, which indicates increasing tax competition. The positive 
aspects of an ACE would struggle to outweigh the negative effects from an increased 
corporate tax rate21. 
 
The trend in Europe seems to be going in two directions; some countries are going in the 
direction of a CBIT, implementing thin-capitalisation rules and earnings-stripping rules. 
These reforms go in the opposite direction of the ACE, limiting or removing the deductibility 
of interest payments to eliminate the debt equity bias. Others like Belgium and Italy have 
implemented ACE reforms. Since there are other alternatives that seem just as popular as the 
ACE, it would be interesting to see further research on the potential implementations of these 
reforms as well. It would also be interesting to see further research on the additional tax 
revenue that could be collected from a higher recurrent property tax or a flat VAT rate.  
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